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1 Introduction
ISO 14000 is a series of voluntary standards for environmental management. It
provides a set of best practice tools and techniques that, if adopted, will osten-
sibly help rms minimize their environmental footprint and conserve resources.
Currently rms can gain certication in only one standard: ISO 14001. This par-
ticular standard is the core of the 14000 series. It outlines what rms must do to
implement an environmental management system (EMS). The number of rms
that have certied their operations under the 14001 EMS has increased rapidly
since 1996. Adoption and certication have been particularly high among ma-
jor multinational corporations. A survey published by the ISO in 2005 reported
the number of ISO 14001 certications stood at 561,943 worldwide in 138 coun-
tries/economies (ISO 2005).
Case study and anecdotal evidence suggests that few rms adopt the ISO
14001 standard out of a concern for the environment or to improve their own
environmental performance. Firms are more likely to give other reasons for
the adoption of the standard, e.g. market access, attention to stakeholder re-
quirements, relief from mandatory regulation, reduced legal liabilities, a greener
public image, lower costs and greater e¢ciency (Morrow and Rodinelli 2002;
OConnor 2002). Given that the adoption of standards poses substantial oppor-
tunity costs for rms, it is important to determine if it provides any real benets.
A focus of this study is whether one of these benets  enhanced e¢ciency  is
associated with the adoption of the standard.
We have plant level data from 1992-2007 on most of the worlds industrial
copper mines. Excluding copper sulde mines, which use a di¤erent technology,
the study covers over 85% of the worlds copper mines. The copper industry is
a truly global industry, one which is both highly competitive and polluting. In
general, we are interested in estimating and understanding the production tech-
nology (as measured by a cost frontier) and ine¢ciencies in this unique data set.
Our specic research question of most interest is whether the adoption of the
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14001 standard impacts on ine¢ciency. The study use data on both the intention
to seek ISO 14001 certication (measured a year before certication is gained,
when rms have made or are making necessary changes in their operations, af-
ter formally announcing the intention to gain certication) and the period when
and after certication is achieved. It examines their impact on mine ine¢ciency
using several approaches, all of which fall within a stochastic frontier frame-
work. All approaches measure ine¢ciency relative to a cost frontier. However,
ine¢ciency is modelled in several di¤erent ways, depending on whether ine¢-
ciency is treated as a random or xed e¤ect and whether explanatory variables
are included in the ine¢ciency distribution. Furthermore, we present results for
di¤erent sub-samples of mines (i.e. open pit and underground). Although it
empirically focuses on the ISO 14001 standard, it is worthwhile noting that the
ISO 9000 and SA 8000 standards are quality management systems similar in
spirit to the ISO 14000 series. All require similar implementation and auditing
behavior. Hence the studys ndings have implications for these other voluntary
standards.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 motivates the
paper in the context of a brief discussion of the ISO 14001 standard, focussing
on quantitative studies measuring its relationship to mine ine¢ciency. Section
3 introduces the econometric model. Section 4 discusses the data set used in
the analysis. It also discusses aspects of the copper mining industry relevant for
the empirical analysis. Section 5 presents empirical results. Section 6 provides
a summary and conclusion.
2 Context: Voluntary Standards & Firm Perfor-
mance
The relationship between environmental standards and rm performance has
been a hotly debated issue in the economic and management literature for
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some years. Some economists argue that any standards2 will impose costs on
a company that will divert resources from other areas of an operation and un-
dermine its competitiveness. They reason that, if e¢ciency gains from adopting
standards exist, then a rational mine would have already adopted them and
would not await for ISO standard to inspire them to do so. In contrast, others
argue that such standards have benecial outcomes for a rms bottom line,
enforcing a discipline on rms through the implementation of an environmental
management system (EMS) that forces managers and sta¤ to continuously think
about and act on reducing the environmental impacts of their production every
step of the way.3 This in turn, leads to less waste and greater conservation of
energy and other resources. In addition, such discipline provides other benets
or "low hanging fruit" in the form of e¢ciency gains. These are assumed to
be achieved, for example, through the adoption of lean green technologies and
inputs and the reduction of costs associated with pollution liabilities and waste
management (Porter and van der Linde 1995).
In most cases these benets have been determined to exist on the basis of
case study and anecdotal evidence only. An example of such a study is Newbold
(2006), who presents a number of case studies of the global mining industry. One
company analyzed is Codelco, all of whose copper mines are represented in our
sample. In 1996 the company decided to become more environmentally respon-
2We use the word "standard" when describing ISO 14001 certication rather than voluntary
regulation or self-regulation, which is common in the literature. Regulations arise from and are
enforced by governments and are legally binding, whereas standards (which may eventually
become regulations) are developed by like-minded associations. Unlike regulations, standards
focus on process rather than outcomes. It could be argued that the main beneciary of
regulations is society. In contrast, customers (and the rms themselves) are potentially the
main beneciaries of standards.
3 It is important to stress that two very similar rms could have quite di¤erent environmen-
tal measures, processes and goals but still gain ISO 14001 certication. In essence, the ISO
14001 is a exible standard that leaves it up to the rm to decide how it is going to achieve
certication within the parameters of the ISO 14001 EMS.
Adoption of the standard involves 5 steps: a) the development of an environmental pol-
icy that has the commitment of senior executives; b) the identication of legal/regulatory
commitments and targeting of areas for improvement of environmental performance; c) a
system for implementation of targets (including programs for training all employees in envi-
ronmental awareness and competency), the delineation of clear responsibilities and channels
of communication and documentation of the EMS, and procedures for control of environmen-
tal impacts of all operations in the rm; d) a system for continual monitoring, measurement
and improvement of environmental performance (including an audit system for reporting and
non-compliance); and e) constant re-evaluation by senior management of the e¤ectiveness of
all internal programs, systems, products, and targets.
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sible and seek ISO 14001 certication across all its mines. Once the decision
was made at the senior level to commit resources to environmental improvement
the next step involved the compilation of a registry of environmental impacts
and applicable legislation and regulations. The control of CO2 emissions, in par-
ticular was a high priority. Specic areas were prioritized for CO2 mitigation
projects and the reduction of energy use through the use of cleaner production
technologies.4 Other steps included engaging the willing participation of all
workers in both its mines and companies in its supply chain, awareness training
of the environmental targets and procedures for their implementation, and the
introduction of better procedures for dealing with other environmental issues,
such as the handling of waste. Agreements were also forged between authori-
ties in respect to on-going management and monitoring of the environment (see
Newbold 2006).
In contrast to these case studies, there are far fewer empirical studies mea-
suring whether voluntary standards provide any benets for the rm. The vast
majority of these empirical studies are concerned with analyzing the relation-
ship between environmental outcomes and the adoption of voluntary standards.
These studies tend to nd a mixed story, with some reporting a positive impact
(e.g. Dasgupta et al 2000; Anton et al 2002, King et al 2005) while others nd
only weak or no evidence (e.g. Barla 2007). Moreover, little of this research
has examined whether the adoption of voluntary environmental standards af-
fects the economic performance of the rm. One exception is the study by
Boyd and McClelland (1999), who use a DEA approach to measure the loss
from potential productive output due to pollution abatement spending in US
paper plants. Productive ine¢ciency is measured in terms of the allocation
of investment capital away from production e¢cient improvements to pollu-
tion abatement spending arising from environmental controls. This abatement
capital constraint was found to contribute to a small decrease in productiv-
ity. Similarly, Anton et al (2002) nd that S&P 500 rms with higher levels
4The company found that during 1999 alone, it had emitted 4671 kton equivalent of CO2
directly or indirectly, largely from electricity use.
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of environmental self-reporting also have higher levels of protability; however,
whether this was related to their higher levels of environmental e¢ciency  the
focus of the study  is unclear. Most of the studies looking at the relationship
between rm economic performance and the adoption of voluntary standards fo-
cus on the ISO 9000 and other service standards. By and large they have found
benets for rms from the adoption of such standards in the form of entry into
new markets, higher volume of sales and better nancial performance (Corbett
et al 2005; Terlaak and King 2005; King and Lenox (2001)).
This study will attempt contribute to this small body of empirical litera-
ture. It focuses on the role that the ISO 14001 standard has on one measure
of economic performance: e¢ciency. As far as we are aware, ours is the rst
such study to empirically investigate the relationship between ISO 14001 and
e¢ciency. To this end, we use a stochastic cost frontier model, which allows for
the estimation of mine-specic ine¢ciency. Specically, we attempt to answer:
Do the economic costs of meeting environmental standards lead to lower e¢-
ciency for the rm? Or, by forcing rms to think and act in a disciplined way
about environmental management, does it lead them to become more e¢cient?
In our measure of ISO 14001 adoption we distinguish between the intention to
seek ISO 14001 certication (the year before certication when rms are mak-
ing or have made necessary changes to their operations and management) and
the period when and after certication is achieved. Our data set indicates that
achieving the 14001 certication can take a mine as long as 6-9 years from the
date of announcement of intention. Hence we also want to capture any potential
e¢ciency improvements before certication since the vast bulk of the steps in
the EMS will be in place by then.
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3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Model & Methods
In order to investigate the impact of the adoption of ISO standard and, more
broadly, the e¢ciency of the copper mines in our data set, we use stochastic
frontier methods. The model begins with a cost frontier where costs of mine i
at time t, Cit; depends on output , Qit, and r input prices, pj;it (for j = 1; ::; r,
t = 1; ::; T and i = 1; ::; N). The translog cost frontier, which denes the
minimum levels of costs achievable by a mine producing Qit facing input prices
pit;1; ::; pit;r, can be written as:
ln (Cit) = + 1 ln (Qit) + 2 ln (Qit)
2
+
Pr
j=1 j ln (Qit) ln (pit;j) +
Pr
j=1 j ln (pit;j)
+
Pr
s=1
P
js sj ln (pit;s) ln (pit;j) + "it + uit
; (1)
where "it reects measurement error and is assumed to be i.i.d. N
 
0; 2

and
uit > 0 is the ine¢ciency of mine i at time t. We will discuss the treatment
of uit below. Su¢ce it to note that (1) is a standard stochastic frontier cost
function and, by restricting uit to be positive, it is given the interpretation as
reecting ine¢ciency (i.e. uit measures how far the costs of mine i are above
best practice at time t). Given our log specication, e¢ciency can be dened
as exp ( uit).
Due to data limitations and in an attempt to control for mine heterogeneity,
we modify this conventional translog cost frontier by adding other explanatory
variables geological and physical factors of the mine that impact on costs. We
call these variables Z1; ::; Zk and include them in the cost frontier as:
5
5Note that some of the variables in Z1; ::; Zk have zero values (e.g. are dummy variables)
and are directly included in the cost function (i.e. are not logged).
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ln (Cit) = + 1 ln (Qit) + 2 ln (Qit)
2
+
Pr
j=1 j ln (Qit) ln (pit;j)+Pr
j=1 it;j ln (pit;j) +
Pr
s=1
P
ji sj ln (pit;s) ln (pit;j)+Pk
j=1 j ln (Zit;j) + "it + uit
: (2)
The key question addressed in this paper is whether certication and the in-
tention to seek certication (designated in the study by the acronyms, ISOACC
and ISOINT, respectively) have an important e¤ect on ine¢ciency. Beginning
with Schmidt and Sickles (1984), a variety of approaches to ine¢ciency measure-
ment have been suggested when using panel data (see also Battesi and Coelli,
1992). These approaches di¤er in their treatment of three issues: i) whether
ine¢ciency is treated as random or xed, ii) whether ine¢ciency depends on
other explanatory variables, and iii) whether ine¢ciency is time-varying or not.
Given the research question of this paper, we want ine¢ciency to depend on
explanatory variables such as ISOACC. In many ways, it is desirable to allow
for time variation in ine¢ciency and, accordingly, our main results allow for
ine¢ciency to vary over time. However, allowing for ine¢ciency to vary over
both i and t can lead imprecise estimation due to the need to estimate TN
ine¢ciencies. Accordingly, as a robustness check we also estimate models where
ine¢ciency for each mine is constant over time. Finally, most of our models as-
sume ine¢ciency is a random variable drawn from a known distribution and we
refer to such models as random e¤ects stochastic frontier models below. How-
ever, as another robustness check, we present results based on the xed e¤ects
ine¢ciency estimator of Schmidt and Sickles (1984).
We adopt the Bayesian methods for e¢ciency analysis with panel data de-
veloped in Koop, Osiewalski and Steel (1997). This allows us to estimate the
entire model, as opposed to a two stage method where the researcher rst esti-
mates mine ine¢ciencies and then runs a second stage regression of ine¢ciency
estimates on explanatory variables. The reader is referred to Koop, Osiewalski
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and Steel (1997) for complete technical details,6 which includes a description of
the posterior simulation algorithms used to produce our empirical results. Here
it is su¢cient to describe the basic modelling ideas.
Let u be TN  vector containing all the uits. We can handle both the time
varying and time-invariant ine¢ciency cases by writing u = Dv where D is a
known matrix and v is a vector containing the distinct ine¢ciencies in the model.
If D = I and v is a TN  vector, then u = v and there is a distinct ine¢ciency
at each point in time for each mine. The case where D = IN 
 T , where T is
a T -dimensional vector of ones and 
 denotes the Kronecker product, implies
ine¢ciency terms which are specic to each mine, but constant over time. The
case of the unbalanced panel is the slight extension of this where D = IN 
 Ti
where Ti is the number of observations for mine i.
Let M denote the number of distinct ine¢ciencies in the model (i.e. M =
TN or M = N). Let W = (wlj) for l = 1; ::;M be a matrix of explanatory
variables for the ine¢ciencies for j = 1; ::; r. The rst column of W contains
an intercept (i.e. all its elements are one). Koop, Osiewalski and Steel (1997)
allow for such explanatory variables to inuence the mean of the ine¢ciency by
introducing a hierarchical structure which adds an s-dimensional extra parame-
ter vector  = (
1
; : : : ; s)
0 with all elements being positive. Given , v has the
following p.d.f.:
p(vj) /
MY
l=1
fG (vlj1; l()) ; (3)
where fG(zja; b) denotes the p.d.f. of a Gamma distribution with mean a=b and
variance a=b2 and, thus, the mean of the ine¢ciency distribution of observation
l is l()
 1. We set the rst argument of the Gamma to 1, which implies an
exponential distribution.
Note that the use of an exponential distribution (a common choice in sto-
chastic frontier analysis) ensures that ine¢ciencies are positive. We allow l()
6Koop, Osiewalski and Steel (1997) derive results for a balanced panel with time-invariant
ine¢ciencies. For the slight extensions of the algorithm necessary to handle an unbalanced
panel with time-varying ine¢ciencies, see Fernandez, Koop and Steel (2000).
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to depend on  in the following way
l() =
rY
j=1

wlj
j : (4)
Our wljs will be dummy variables (plus an intercept). Thus, in this specication
j will measure the impact of explanatory variable j on ine¢ciency. To aid in
interpretation of our empirical results consider the following example. In one of
our models, W will contain an intercept and the ISOACC dummy variable. In
this case 
2
will measure the impact of adopting ISO standards on ine¢ciency.
Mines which have adopted ISO standards will have mean ine¢ciency of (
1

2
)
 1
whereas those which have not have mean ine¢ciency of (
1
)
 1
. If 
2
> 1 then
ISO accredited rms will have lower ine¢ciency than non-accredited rms. But
if 
2
< 1 then non-accredited rms will have lower ine¢ciency. If 
2
= 1 then
ISO accreditation has no impact on ine¢ciency.
In our empirical results, we implement this model with the two di¤erent
choices for D described above, with di¤erent choices for W and with di¤erent
sub-samples of the data. Note that, for most of our mines, the elements of W
are constant over time (e.g. most of the mines either have ISO accreditation
for all periods or for none). For the exceptions to this, when we are working
with time-varying ine¢ciencies, the components of W will be time-varying. But
when we are working with time-invariant ine¢ciencies, we set the appropriate
element of W to 1 if ISO standards are adopted at any point in time (and it is
set equal to zero only if ISO standards are never adopted).
Equations (2), (3) and (4) can be thought of as a stochastic frontier variant
of a random e¤ects panel data model, since the ine¢ciencies are assumed to be
drawn from the random distribution given in (3). Koop, Osiewalski and Steel
(1997) also derive a xed e¤ects version of the stochastic frontier model based
on the xed e¤ects e¢ciency analysis of Schmidt and Sickles (1984). That is,
instead of assuming a specication like (3) for the ine¢ciencies, they are mod-
elled using mine-specic dummy variables and transformed into ine¢ciencies as
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described in Schmidt and Sickles (1984) or Koop, Osiewalski and Steel (1997).
The reader is referred to these papers for additional details. It is su¢cient at this
stage to note that the inclusion of so many mine specic dummy variables can
often result in imprecise estimation. Moreover, it is also di¢cult to generalize
this approach to allow for explanatory such explanatory variables as ISOACC
to explain the ine¢ciencies. For these reasons, most researchers prefer to work
with random e¤ects specications. However, xed e¤ects specications are typ-
ically interpreted as being more robust to endogeneity concerns and, hence, we
also estimate xed e¤ects stochastic frontier models as a robustness check.7
Further to the issue of endogeneity we note that our model involves two main
equations: one denes a cost frontier and the second one relates the ine¢ciencies
to explanatory variables. Endogeneity is not an issue in the cost frontier since
it can simply be interpreted as a mechanical method for estimating a best-
practice frontier. Intuitively, the frontier that mine A faces is dened by mines
with similar input prices and outputs and other characteristics (e.g. geology).
Endogeneity issues are not relevant to this part of the analysis. It is only in
our second equation, where we try to interpret why some mines are more or less
e¢cient than others that the problem of endogeneity becomes relevant. That is,
our model will be able to estimate the impact of ISO adoption on ine¢ciency.
However, it may be di¢cult to distinguish between various stories for why this
impact is occurring and whether any impact we nd is causal. This issue is
discussed in further detail in the empirical results section below, but su¢ce it
to say that it is for this reason that we include results from the xed e¤ects
approach as a robustness check on our results.
Furthermore, motivated by the potential endogeneity issue, some of our re-
sults include an extra explanatory variable, CO2 (in addition to the ISOACC
variable) in the ine¢ciency distribution. This variable is dened in the next
section, but it is worthwhile here to explain why we include it. For present
7Bayesian methods require a prior. Throughout we use noninformative priors. That is,
for the coe¢cients of the frontier and 2 we use conventional noninformative priors. In the
random e¤ects model, for the parameters characterizing the ine¢ciency distribution, we use
the same relatively noninformative priors as in Koop, Osiewalski and Steel (1997).
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purposes, note that it is a measure of whether a mine is emitting a relatively
high or low level of CO2 emissions. As such, it can be thought of as reecting
each mines current environmental performance. To see why the inclusion of
CO2 as an explanatory variable in the ine¢ciency distribution should mitigate
worries about endogeneity, let us consider how endogeneity might arise in the
rst place. Suppose we nd that mines which adopt ISO standards are more
e¢cient. It could be that this reects a causal relationship in that the actions
taken as part of ISO adoption are leading to higher e¢ciency. But it is possible
that environmentally-minded rms are both more e¢cient to begin with and are
more likely to adopt ISO standards. If such a story is true, then ISO standards
are not having a direct causal e¤ect on ine¢ciency. If we can nd a measure of
"environmentally-mindedness we can control for this and, if the ISO variable
is still associated with higher e¢ciency, then we can be more condent that
endogeneity worries are not a problem. We conjecture that CO2 might be a
measure of "environmentally-mindedness that is not directly associated with
the variables in the cost frontier and, thus, might help assuage the reader of
endogeneity concerns.
4 Data
Data for the study came from a variety of sources. ISO data came from annual
company reports and direct inquiries with head o¢ce. Other data came from
company annual reports, stock exchange lings, and two proprietary industry
datasets (Minecost 2007; RMG 2007) which measure a range of geological, pro-
duction and cost data for the global mining industry. CO2 emissions data were
calculated using emission coe¢cients for each countrys electricity use, according
to the IPCC standards for GHG inventories.8 Table 1 lists the variables, their
acronyms along with their denitions. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for
our unbalanced panel of 99 copper mines from 1992 to 2007 which contains 1265
8Available at:
http://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/2006gl/index.html
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observations. The sample has a representation from the major copper producing
countries of the world, with important medium level producers such as Zam-
bia and Peru. More than one half of the mines are situated in four countries:
USA, Canada, Chile and Mexico. All variables measured in monetary units are
expressed in US dollars with local currencies being converted into US dollars
using the annual average exchange rate.
The study conceptually denes variables through their inclusion in the fol-
lowing groups:
Group 1: Total costs
Group 2: Output measure
Group 3: Prices of inputs
Group 4: Investment
Group 5: Physical/geological factors
Group 6: ISO and CO2 variables
4.0.1 Dependent Variable
Group 1. The studys dependent variable measures total costs (TOTAL) for the
mine of mining and milling Cu ore. This variable is measured in US dollars per
day. It includes all onsite milling and mining costs involved in the extraction
and processing of metal from ore using the inputs of energy, capital and labour.
4.0.2 Independent Variables
Group 2. Output measure. The studys output measure (METAL) is the
amount of Cu metal produced in kilotonnes per year.
Group 3. The study includes a number of input prices. Two price inputs mea-
sure energy costs: diesel and electricity. Diesel (DIESEL) costs are measured
in US cents/liter. Electricity (ELECT) costs are measured in US cents/kwh.
Other inputs include grinding media (the costs of metallic and other mate-
rials for grinding ore) in US dollars per tonne. Reagents/acid input prices
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(REAGENT), another important input price relevant to the milling stage, is
measured in US cents/kg. The price of labour (WAGES) is measured as the
average hourly labor cost in US dollars. Another input price (GRIND) applies
to grinding media (the price of metallic balls for grinding and crushing ore). It
is measured in US dollars/tonne.
Group 4. The studys investment variable measure capital investment as
capital expenditure (CAPEX) in US millions of dollars per year.
Group 5. These factors relate to both geological and other characteristics of
the mine that a¤ect how di¢cult it is to access the ore and how much equipment
and manpower is required to mine and mill it. The rst of these variables
(TYPE) controls for type of mine, i.e. open pit vs. underground. It is a dummy
variable; 1 for underground and 0 for open pit. In the few cases where mines have
both open pit and underground operations, the study assigns them the value of
1 for underground mines on the basis that open pit mines are often precursors
to underground mines. Another geological characteristic that impacts on the
costs of both mining and milling is grade of ore (OREGRADE). This variable
is measured as the percentage of Cu metal within the ore. Lower grade ores,
for instance, are harder to access and create more waste in the processing of the
ore.
Another variable (DRILLCOND), is an index of geological characteristics
summarizing drilling patterns and power usage. This index ranges from 0.6
(good) to 2.0 (poor) and applies to open pit mines only. Its underground
mine counterpart (GROUNDCOND) is an index that depends on rock com-
petence and other conditions. This number ranges from 1 (good) to 5.0 (poor).
Since DRILLCOND and GROUNDCOND apply to underground and open pit
mines, respectively, we interact them with their respective underground/open
pit dummy variables. An ore work index (WORK) is also included. This vari-
able is applicable to both types of mining practices. It measures the amount of
power required to crush and grind ore and is measured in kwh/t.
In addition to these physical/geological factors, the study controls for scale
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of mining. Recent research suggests that size of an operation may inuence to a
certain degree whether rms will be likely to join voluntary programs as a result
of lower marginal abatement costs due to economies of scale and greater number
of personnel and exposure to liabilities (Barla 2007; Videras & Alberini 2000;
Arora & Cason 1995). This scale variable (MILL) is measured as the total ore
treated in each mine in kilotonnes per year. The study uses a milling measure
rather than a mining measure of total output since the former is an end product
of the operations the study measures. It represents the pure ore, treated after
extraction, crushing and grinding, to remove waste rock and other metals.
Finally, the variable YEARS controls for the number of years the mine has
been in operation. Its inclusion is meant to control for the fact that newer mines
are likely to have more sophisticated equipment, particularly, environmental
controls in place, making ISO certication easier to obtain and thus make less
substantive di¤erence in heir operations. However, it is worth stressing that a
majority of mines in the study are relatively recent (i.e. opened in the late 1980s
and early 1990s). This variable is measured in years since the opening of the
mine. We also include a variable named DAYS, designed to captured durational
di¤erences in operation that may a¤ect costs. It controls for the number of days
per year the mine is in operation.
Group 6. Two variables measure aspects of the ISO 14001 voluntary standard.
One regulatory variable (ISOINT) measures the intention of mines to seek ISO
14001 certication. This dummy variable is observed one year before a mine
seeks certication. At this point, the mine will have made and/or be making
changes in its management en-route to eventual certication. The attainment
of 14001 certication is a dummy variable, ISOACC. As part of the process of
eventual certication all rms have to publicly announce their intention to seek
ISO 14001 certication. Obtaining certication can take a rm several or more
years. In short, certication does not come immediately after the expressed
intention to seek certication. Certication must be obtained by accredited
external agencies who are also responsible for on-going monitoring to ensure
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compliance.
Our nal variable is a dummy variable. For the reasons discussed at the
end of Section 3, we include a CO2 measure as a control for endogeneity. The
variable measures whether a mines CO2 emissions per unit of metal produced
are above or below average based on total CO2 emissions from electricity gen-
eration. Specically, it is calculated from the kwh of electricity generated per
unit ton of ore produced for each mine, using greenhouse gas emissions con-
version factors for electricity production for each countrys national grid. It
excludes CO2 emissions from diesel fuel, another important energy source for
mines. Diesel fuel use, and thus the level of resulting CO2 emissions generated,
is not always directly under the mines control (e.g. the steepness of the terrain
will a¤ect on site transportation and thus the amount of diesel fuel used).
Equations (2) and (4) describe precisely how these variables enter the model,
where the Group 1 variable is labelled yit, the Group 2 variable Qit, Group 3
variables are the pit;j , Groups 4 and 5 are the Zit;j and Group 6 are in wlj .
****Tables 1 & 2 Here****
5 Empirical Results
We use two main stochastic frontier methodologies: random e¤ects with time
varying e¢ciencies and random e¤ects with time invariant e¢ciencies. We also
consider three di¤erent choices for our explanatory variables in the ine¢ciency
distribution: only ISOACC, a dummy for either ISOACC or ISOINT, and both
the ISOACC and CO2 variables. Moreover, we consider three di¤erent sub-
samples of the data: a) all the mines; b) open pit mines only; and c) underground
mines only. This gives us 18 main sets of results (i.e. 2x3x3). In addition, we use
the xed e¤ects analysis to independently investigate the robustness of results
in certain key dimensions. In the interest of brevity, we do not present results
from all these analyses. For the coe¢cients in the cost frontier we only present
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results for 3 cases: random e¤ects with ISOACC as only variable in the e¢ciency
distribution (time varying and time invariant cases) and the xed e¤ects model.
The crucial issue in the paper is the relationship between the ISO variables and
ine¢ciency. For this issue we present a complete set of results for all cases. Note
that underground mines have 668 observations (53 mines); open pit mines 597
observations (47 mines).
5.1 Results for the Cost Frontier
Tables 3 and 4 present point estimates (posterior means) and posterior standard
deviations for the coe¢cients of the cost function for the studys three di¤erent
modelling approaches. We informally refer to point estimates as being signif-
icant if the posterior mean is two standard deviations from zero. The basic
story from these tables is that the 3 di¤erent approaches are broadly similar.
For variables which enter linearly (as in Table 4) this is evidently clear. The
coe¢cient estimates for these investment and physical/geological variables are,
for the most part, highly signicant and of the expected sign. Note that the
coe¢cient on DAYS is negative. But, since the dependent variable is measured
as costs per day, this is not necessarily counter-intuitive. For the variables which
enter nonlinearly, it is less clear that the implied frontier is similar for the dif-
ferent econometric approaches. But an examination of implied marginal e¤ects
of each variable indicate that they quite similar across the di¤erent approaches.
There is strong evidence that the use of the translog functional form is impor-
tant since many of the squares and cross products of the explanatory variables
are often signicant.
****Tables 3 & 4 Here****
5.2 Results for the Ine¢ciency Distribution
Table 5 presents results for the coe¢cients on the explanatory variables in the
ine¢ciency distribution. Their interpretation is discussed after (4) and the
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reader is reminded that a coe¢cient estimate of one indicates the explanatory
variable has no e¤ect on ine¢ciency. Thus, we refer to a variable as being
signicant if it is two posterior standard deviations from one. The 18 rows of
the table correspond to the 18 main sets of results described above.
Results using all the observations (i.e. with only a dummy variable to ac-
count for di¤erences between open-pit and underground mines) are strong and
signicant when we allow for a time-varying ine¢ciency distribution. ISO ac-
creditation is associated with less ine¢ciency (or, equivalently, higher e¢ciency).
This holds true regardless of whether we use a variable for actual ISO accredi-
tation or actual or intended accreditation. Importantly, it also holds true when
we include the CO2 variable in the ine¢ciency distribution. For reasons dis-
cussed at the end of Section 3, inclusion of CO2 should control for one potential
endogeneity issue. The fact that the coe¢cient CO2 variable is less than one
(and signicant) indicates that mines with high CO2 emissions are likely to be
more ine¢cient. However, even controlling for this e¤ect, we are still nding
ISO accreditation to have a signicant impact on ine¢ciency.
These ndings, however, are not that robust to our di¤erent statistical
methodologies and choice of sub-samples of the observations. When we use
a time-invariant ine¢ciency distribution, ISO accreditation has no signicant
impact on ine¢ciency (even when we control for CO2). Similarly, when we
work only with open pit mines, nothing is signicant. It is only for under-
ground mines that we nd results that are similar to those described in the
previous paragraph (although posterior standard deviations tend to be larger
with this smaller data set and, hence, we have fewer signicant results).
Note however, that there is one way in which we could argue that our results
are robust. This is in respect to the main research question motivating this pa-
per: Does the adoption of the ISO 14001 EMS have any impact on ine¢ciency?
Our results may disagree about whether ISO accreditation is good for e¢ciency
or has no impact on e¢ciency. However, no econometrician could reasonably
interpret the results to mean that adopting the ISO 14001 standard leads to
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greater ine¢ciency (even allowing for potential endogeneity).
A consideration of xed e¤ects stochastic frontier results also indicate endo-
geneity is not an important worry in the sense that (where comparable) ine¢-
ciency estimates are similar to those found using random e¤ects methods. To
be precise: the correlation between the ine¢ciencies estimated using the random
e¤ects stochastic frontier model (with time invariant ine¢ciency) and xed ef-
fects stochastic frontier model is 0.801. Conventionally, xed e¤ects models are
thought of as being less susceptible to endogeneity worries than random e¤ects
approaches. Thus the results can o¤er some reassurance that our random e¤ects
models are not too a¤ected by endogeneity.
***Table 5 Here***
6 Discussion and conclusion
The number of rms adopting the ISO 14001 standard since its inception in
1996 has risen dramatically. However, while there is a wide body of qualitative
case study and anecdotal literature on the consequences of ISO 14001 for rm
performance, there has been little empirical research examining whether it lives
up to its promise. This study has contributed to the small but growing body
of empirical studies that have analyzed the impact of ISO 14001 and 14001-
like EMS systems on rm performance. Case study and anecdotal evidence
suggests enhanced e¢ciency is an important motivation for seeking ISO 14001
certication. Some managers consider it to be more important than indeed, as
even driving  environmental concerns. This study has looked at the impacts of
ISO 14001 on e¢ciency in a plant-level study of the global copper industry. We
investigated several di¤erent econometric methodologies and di¤erent sub-sets
of the data. Such an approach is useful since results that are robust to di¤erent
methods are more believable than those presented for a single method.
It found some evidence that ISO 14001 certication may be associated with
greater e¢ciency. On the whole, however, this evidence was not robust across
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model choice or sample. How do we interpret this indeterminate nding? First,
it may be a reection of the diversity of reasons given by rms for adopting
the standard. The case study literature has shown that rms pursue ISO 14001
certication for a variety of reasons. Thus, while mines may make substantive
changes in their operations en-route to achieving certication, it could be that
these are not impacting primarily on e¢ciency. Second, as mentioned above,
it may be that these outcomes are linked to specic internal or external cir-
cumstances and characteristics of mines, which are not easy to identify in this
kind of study. Third, managers in the copper industry may be seeking ISO
14001 certication for purely symbolic rather than substantive reasons. If this
is the case, then commitment to achieving the objectives of the standard, the
integration of support throughout the mine, the nancial resources devoted to
its implementation, and the level of employee and managerial awareness and ef-
fort employed to achieve certication, will be supercial at best. Without more
substantive changes, e¢ciency gains may not be achievable. Finally, the reason
may lie outside the internal operations of the rm itself. Although the standard
does require third-party auditors, thereby reducing opportunities for shirking
and free-riding, accountability to the standard is weakened due to both the lack
of disclosure of third-party audits and strong sanctions against non-conformity
once certication is achieved. In this case, a standard without su¢cient "teeth"
or transparency will be unlikely to have much impact on mine performance
beyond a very supercial level.
Whichever story is the correct one, our study does provide some comfort to
managers in the global copper industry who have implemented or are planning
to adopt an ISO 14001 EMS: There is no evidence that it will lower e¢ciency.
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Table 1: Variable Measures & Acronyms
Variable Measure
TOTALCOST Total onsite mining and milling costs per day (US $)
MTMILL Ore milled per year (kt)
METAL CU metal produced (kt)
TYPE Underground or open pit mine (0=open pit; 1=underground)
WAGES Average Hourly Wage Cost (US $/hour)
POWER Electricity Costs (US c/kwh)
DIESEL Diesel Fuel Costs (US c/litre)
GRIND Grinding Media Costs ($/ton)
DRILLCOND
Drilling conditions (OP mines)
Index of drilling patterns/powder usage
(Ranges from 0.6=good to 2.0 =severe).
GOUNDCOND
Ground conditions (UG mines)
Index of rock competence/ other conditions
(Ranges from 1=good to 5=poor)
WORKINX
Ore work index for crushing/grinding ore (kwh/ton)
Power required to break ore from a theoretically
innite size to 80% passing 100 m
REAGENT Reagents/acid (US c/kg)
ISOINT
Intention to seek ISO 14001 accreditation prior to year of certication
0=no intention; 1=intention
ISOACC ISO 14001 accreditation (0=no accreditation; 1=accreditation)
CAPEX Capital expenditure on mine and mill (US $ million) per annum
DAYS Number of days mine open during the year
OREGRADE Grade of ore milled (measured as a percentage of metal within the ore)
CO2
CO2 emissions from electricity generation per ton of ore mined & milled
1=above average; 0= below average
YEARS Number of years mine has been in operation
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean St Dev Min Max
TOTALCOST 1.69105 2.00105 7.65103 2.32106
MTMILL 1.52104 2.65104 59.316 2.34105
METAL 181.492 796.103 0.078 8634.2
TYPE 0.528 0.499 0 1
WAGES 15.455 8.843 1.266 47.698
POWER 5.410 1.475 1.152 18.303
DIESEL 36.304 21.774 1.218 165.520
GRIND 551.071 102.971 21.994 675.203
DRILLCOND 0.267 0.294 0 .9
GOUNDCOND 0.644 0.705 0 4
WORKINX 12.829 2.007 7 23
REAGENT 0.195 0.316 0.001 2.826
ISOINT .0261 0.159 0 1
ISOACC 0.123 0.328 0 1
CAPEX 11.963 14.507 0 150
DAYS 317.941 69.284 25 365
OREGRADE 0.032 0.117 0.007 0.858
YEARS 31.222 29.275 -8 116
CO2 0.144 0.351 0 1
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Table 3: Posterior Properties of Conventional Translog Coe¢cients
Explanatory Variable
Stoch Frontier
Time-varying E¤
Stoch Frontier
Time-invariant E¤
Stoch Frontier
Fixed E¤ects
Mean St Dev Mean St Dev Mean St Dev
METAL 0.027 0.189 -0.272 0.163 -0.559 0.169
WAGE 0.455 0.516 2.645 0.471 2.129 0.491
POWER 1.413 0.659 -0.891 0.563 -2.785 0.533
DIESEL 0.285 0.236 0.279 0.232 0.475 0.246
GRIND -0.642 0.380 0.089 0.321 -0.518 0.317
REAGENT 0.601 0.206 0.543 0.137 0.354 0.134
METAL2 0.004 0.002 0.011 0.002 0.008 0.003
WAGE2 0.152 0.016 0.065 0.022 0.034 0.025
POWER2 -0.029 0.068 -0.058 0.053 0.067 0.052
DIESEL2 0.030 0.025 0.029 0.016 0.041 0.017
GRIND2 0.025 0.039 0.013 0.033 0.028 0.034
REGLB2 -0.026 0.007 -0.011 0.006 -0.010 0.011
METALWAGE 0.006 0.006 0.060 0.008 0.006 0.013
METALPOWER -0.004 0.020 -0.032 0.017 -0.041 0.022
METALDIESEL 0.019 0.009 0.005 0.007 0.001 0.010
METALGRIND -0.018 0.028 0.011 0.025 0.053 0.026
METALREAGENT -0.030 0.007 -0.030 0.005 -0.030 0.001
WAGEPOWER -0.222 0.047 -0.132 0.041 -0.097 0.042
WAGEDIESEL -0.104 0.026 -0.109 0.020 -0.106 0.022
WAGEGRIND -0.049 0.079 -0.322 0.072 -0.228 0.075
WAGEREAGENT 0.034 0.025 0.179 0.017 0.208 0.018
POWERDIESEL 0.153 0.055 0.083 0.037 0.052 0.039
POWERGRIND -0.141 0.097 0.24 0.083 0.471 0.080
POWERREAGENT 0.143 0.034 0.064 0.037 0.009 0.038
DIESELGRIND -0.064 0.040 -0.065 0.035 -0.091 0.037
DIESELREAGENT 0.028 0.021 -0.030 0.013 -0.020 0.013
GRINDREAGENT -0.147 0.033 -0.103 0.022 -0.071 0.02126
Table 4: Posterior Properties of Other Coe¢cients in Cost Frontier
Explanatory Variable
Stoch Frontier
Time-var E¤
Stoch Frontier
Time-invariant E¤
Stoch Frontier
Fixed E¤ects
Mean St Dev Mean St Dev Mean St Dev
CAPEX 0.015 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.001
TYPE 0.336 0.059 0.373 0.110 0.324 0.167
DRILL 0.150 0.098 0.441 0.159 0.298 0.187
GROUND 0.062 0.024 0.133 0.021 0.187 0.022
WORKINX 0.174 0.059 1.058 0.172 1.123 0.284
DAYS -0.461 0.036 -0.511 0.024 -0.520 0.025
MILLED 0.416 0.014 0.589 0.017 0.608 0.020
OREGRADE 0.033 0.009 0.047 0.018 -0.011 0.021
YEARS 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.001 -0.003 0.002
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Table 5: Posterior Properties of Coe¢cients in Ine¢ciency Distribution
Ine¤. Dist. ISOACC ISOACC+ISOINT CO2
Mean St Dev Mean St Dev Mean St Dev
All Observations
Time Varying 1.536 0.176 - - - -
Time Varying - - 1.521 0.162 - -
Time Varying 1.507 0.170 - - 0.726 0.070
Time Invariant 0.972 0.206 - - - -
Time Invariant - - 0.995 0.210 - -
Time Invariant 1.019 0.214 - - 1.133 0.265
Open Pit Mines Only
Time Varying 1.093 0.148 - - - -
Time Varying - - 1.089 0.138 - -
Time Varying 1.078 0.147 - - 0.835 0.157
Time Invariant 0.847 0.256 - - - -
Time Invariant - - 0.894 0.269 - -
Time Invariant 0.849 0.255 - - 0.876 0.540
Underground Mines Only
Time Varying 1.433 0.277 - - - -
Time Varying - - 1.535 0.468 - -
Time Varying 1.414 0.230 - - 0.718 0.109
Time Invariant 1.053 0.314 - - - -
Time Invariant - - 1.040 0.311 - -
Time Invariant 1.028 0.312 - - 0.929 0.259
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